

DRAFT
26 August 1957

Gentlemen,

Our object in this presentation is to outline for you significant intelligence of critical value to major national intelligence objectives that we anticipate will result from the coverage of certain Soviet targets which are within the range of U-2 aircraft. Whereas we are vitally interested in coverage on SAC-type targets and the eventual preparation of folders thereon, this is not the objective of our briefing today. All of the principal targets we will discuss fall into those areas of Soviet strength that have been determined by the National Intelligence Community to be the most significant in its ability to strike at the United States.

These are: The Soviet guided missile system, the Soviet long range bomber force, and Soviet nuclear energy production system.

Our present intelligence on all of these critical Soviet capabilities still contains major areas of ignorance. A significant quantity of our

existing information on these strengths is fragmentary, and, consequently, our present estimates admit to significant margins of error.

US defense plans and budgets to support them involve vast sums of money and, admittedly, based on information having these significant margins of error. Accordingly, such plans and budgets can be materially affected by reducing the margins of error.

A few examples of the state of our missing information will point up this matter. Thus, until ten days ago, we had no observation of any Soviet GM efforts though we have from other intelligence sources had knowledge of perhaps a couple of hundred firings on the KAPUSTIN YAR range. We have had no information regarding launching pads, erection and handling equipment, guidance installation and equipment, test stands, fuel storage, and other associated launching devices. Data on these items are essential for any firm statement as to the size, type, and pay load

of missiles, guidance systems, and types of engines used for propulsion.

At TYURA TAM, we have shown here developments bearing on these questions in a relatively new range still under construction and thus far reliably known to have fired at least twice. The overcast on the far oblique in this display obscures our ability to identify what is suggested, namely, all of the equipment and possibly missiles related to actual launch though there is clear and convincing evidence bearing upon the support elements. We intend to go back if possible to clarify the launching site at TYURA TAM. It is our expectation that comparable coverage of KAPUSTIN YAR would be extraordinarily rewarding in establishing for the first time a set of basic data against which further intelligence coverage from all sources could lead us to improve significantly our estimates on the state of the GM art in the Soviet. This photograph on TYURA TAM leads some experts to suspect that the

Soviet is two years ahead of our current estimate of their progress.

Let me illustrate further possibilities in narrowing our margins of error in two other critical fields, namely, atomic energy production and long range bomber capacity.